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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State claims that a violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004 occurs not when a defendant
drives, but when a defendant submits breath samples over the legal limit, and it is clear that the
legislature intended this.  This is wrong.  Under Idaho law, the lapse of time between driving and
testing is relevant to the weight the jury attributes to the test results.  The State also argues that it
was not fundamental error to deny Mr. Austin an opportunity to allow the jury to properly weigh
the test results.  The statute is therefore void for vagueness and overbroad as it was applied to
Mr. Austin.  This violated his due process rights.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Austin’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief but are
incorporated herein by reference.
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ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it granted the State’s motion in limine
because it did not apply the relevant precedent correctly and violated Mr. Austin’s due
process right to present a complete defense?





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Granted The State’s Motion In Limine
Because It Did Not Interpret Or Apply The Relevant Precedent Correctly, And It Violated
Mr. Austin’s Constitutional Right To Present A Complete Defense
Just because the State is not required to prove something does not mean a defendant
cannot even mention it in his defense.  Equating these is where the district court abused its
discretion.  Approximately 30 minutes after Mr. Austin was stopped by an Ada County Sheriff’s
Deputy, he submitted two breath samples.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.199, Ls.4-14.)  That period of time was
relevant  because  it  went  to  the  weight  the  jury  could  give  the  test  results.   “The  lapse  of  time
prior to the extraction of samples goes to the weight to be afforded the test results and not to their
admissibility.” State v. Sutliff, 97 Idaho 523, 524 (1976) (citations omitted); State v. Robinett,
141 Idaho 110, 113 (2005).
Therefore, preventing Mr. Austin from presenting expert testimony that would allow the
jury to weigh the test results—based on facts such as his physical characteristics and when he
last consumed alcohol—was an abuse of discretion.  (App. Br., pp.17-20.)  Indeed, without such
scientific testimony, the majority of jurors would have no idea how the lapse of time affected the
test results.
The State, relying on the language from Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Dep’t of Transp., 153 Idaho
200 (2012) as determinative,1 argues that the driving under the influence statute clearly was
intended to criminalize testing above the legal limit.  (Resp. Br., pp.8-17.)  But the differences
between this case and Elias-Cruz are crucial. Elias-Cruz concerned the margin of error in the
1 The State also relies on this Court’s holding in State v. Jones, 160 Idaho 449 (2016).  (Resp.
Br., p.15.)  However, Jones concerned a measurement of uncertainty issue and is therefore also
distinguishable from this case. Id. at 450.
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testing machinery. Id. at 202-06.    Lapse of time between driving and testing was not at issue.
This is a crucial distinction because while margin of error has not been held to be relevant, lapse
of time has been held to be relevant.  And Elias-Cruz acknowledged this. Id. at 203 (quoting
Robinett, 141 Idaho at 113).  The district court, and the State in its argument here, overlooked
this  distinction.   Indeed,  the  State  simply  repeats  the  well-established  rule  that  there  is  no
constitutional right to present irrelevant evidence.  (Resp. Br., pp.16-17.)  But lapse of time
evidence is relevant. Robinett, 141 Idaho at 113.  In fact, this Court in Robinett held that the
only reason it is appropriate for a district court to admit test results taken well after driving is
because the jury can consider the time lapse. Id.
The State claims that a violation of the statute occurs not when a defendant drives but
when a defendant tests over the limit.  (Resp. Br., pp.7, 10, 15, 16.)  This claim actually supports
Mr.  Austin’s  argument  that,  if  this  is  the  case,  the  words  “to  drive”  have  been  read  out  of  the
statute.  (App. Br., p.23.)  But the fact that the lapse of time between driving and testing is
relevant means testing above the limit is not the crime; contrary to the State’s portrayal of the
current state of the law, the crime identified in I.C. § 18-8004 is still driving with an alcohol
concentration over the legal limit.
The fact that the State could get test results admitted without having to extrapolate those
results did not preclude Mr. Austin from bringing in evidence to show that his alcohol
concentration was within the legal limit when he was driving.  If it did so preclude him, then
defendants such as Mr. Austin would be barred from presenting a defense to each element of a
crime.   That  is  what  happened  here.   Driving  is  an  element  of  this  crime,  and  therefore
Mr. Austin’s due process rights were violated.  (App. Br., pp.21-24.)
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Finally, the State claims “it is clear that the legislature intended the operative BAC to be
the BAC at the time of the analysis, not the BAC while driving.”  (Resp. Br., p.17.)  This is most
certainly not clear.  Again, the State argues as if the issue is what evidence the State may submit
as proof of a violation.  The issue here, though, revolves around the defendant’s right to rebut the
State’s evidence.  It is true that it is not possible to analyze breath, blood, or urine at the moment
of driving.  But that does mean the crime is no longer driving with an alcohol concentration over
the legal limit.  That does not mean a defendant cannot raise doubts about the evidence submitted
against him.  The logic of the State’s argument is simply flawed.  Indeed, most crimes are proven
with evidence gathered after the alleged criminal act.  Yet defendants have a right to question or
rebut that evidence.  That is due process. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294
(1973).  Our system allows defenses; it does not simply redefine the crime to meet the evidence
gathered by the State.  When the district court granted the State’s motion in limine to exclude
Mr. Austin’s evidence refuting the meaning of the State’s alcohol concentration evidence, it
denied him due process.
II.
The Dicta in Tomlinson Renders Idaho Code § 18-8004 Overbroad And Void For Vagueness As
Applied
The State suggests that, “Austin is not actually challenging the constitutionality of Idaho
Code § 18-8004 itself” (Resp. Br., p.20.), but this misapprehends Mr. Austin’s argument.  The
statute, on its face, does not prohibit a defendant from raising a defense to the crime.
(App. Br., p.27.)  However, as argued in the Appellant’s Brief, the statute was rendered
overbroad and void for vagueness as it was applied in this case when the district court held that,
under “the existing case law,” Mr. Austin could not raise a defense to rebut the State’s evidence
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that he was over the legal limit while driving.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.8.)  Therefore,
Mr. Austin is challenging the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-8004 as it was interpreted and applied
by the district court to these facts.
Regarding the first prong of the fundamental error test, the State argues that I.C. § 18-
8004 is not void for vagueness as applied because “[t]he statute, as interpreted by case law, does
not fail to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”
(Resp. Br., p.22.)  The State argues, “That ‘close cases can be envisioned’ is insufficient to
‘render a statute vague’ because the state must still prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Resp. Br., p.22.)  First, this is a close case.  Mr. Austin’s alcohol concentration was .085/.086
when he submitted to breath tests approximately 30 minutes after he was first stopped and
approximately 45 minutes after he consumed alcohol.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.316, L.15 – p.320, L.9.)
Therefore,  his  expert  would  have  testified  that  his  alcohol  concentration  was  rising  as  he  was
waiting for the breath tests, and was below the legal limit when he was driving.  (R., p.122.)
Moreover, the fact that his breath tests were just over the legal limit showed that Mr. Austin’s
conduct did not, as the State claims, fall “squarely within the ‘hard core’ of Idaho Code § 18-
8004’s proscriptions.”  (Resp. Br., pp.22-23.)  Second, the State did not have to prove its case
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Mr. Austin did not get the ability to call his expert and raise a
defense because the district court held that, under the precedent, his alcohol concentration when
he was driving was not relevant.  Thus, the statute as applied imposed a mandatory conclusive
presumption, which violated Mr. Austin’s right to have the State prove all the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.27-32.)
Additionally, this shows how the statute, as interpreted in the dicta in State v. Tomlinson,
159 Idaho 112, 122 (Ct. App. 2015), actually does fail to provide a person of ordinary
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intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.  Most people of ordinary intelligence likely assume,
quite reasonably, that they are prohibited from driving with a certain alcohol concentration.  The
State’s position is that people of ordinary intelligence have fair notice that what is actually
prohibited by the statute is testing over the legal limit sometime after driving.  (Resp. Br., p.22.)
This is absurd.  It is common knowledge that people of ordinary intelligence use the acronyms
DUI or DWI to describe this crime.  The “D” stands for “Driving.”
With respect to the second prong of the fundamental error test, the State asserts that the
error here is not clear from the record because “there was no constitutional violation” and
“[e]ven  if  there  was  error  for  the  district  court  to  not sua sponte rule I.C. § 18-8004
unconstitutional,” such error was not clear from the record.  (Resp. Br., pp.24-25.)  On the
contrary, the error is clear from the record here because the district court was aware that denying
Mr. Austin the ability to bring in an expert to testify as to his alcohol concentration while he was
driving was a due process violation.  The district court’s comments and questions on this issue
demonstrated this awareness.  (See App. Br., pp.5-8.)  For example, when Mr. Austin’s counsel
reiterated his concern that Mr. Austin should be able to present extrapolation evidence “under his
due  process  rights  applied  to  the  state  under  the  14th  Amendment  of  the  United  States
Constitution,” the district court said, “Conceptually, I’ll agree with you . . . and if I had a blank
tablet that I was operating under, I would say, you know, you’re right.  But the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court have ruled on the issue.  Admittedly I don’t think they ever discussed the
due process concept.”  (Tr. Vol.2, p.26, L.16 - p.27, L.10.)  It is hard to imagine any statement on
the subject being more clear.
Finally, the State argues that Mr. Austin has failed to show the error here was harmless
because “Austin would still have been convicted under the impairment theory of DUI.”
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(Resp. Br., p.26.)  This was not a foregone conclusion.  Nevertheless, the State lists several facts
such as “Austin’s eyes were ‘a little bloodshot and glassy’ and his speech was a ‘a little bit’
slow,” and “Austin failed field sobriety tests” as though these facts definitely prove that the jury
would have found Mr. Austin guilty under the impairment theory.  (Resp. Br., p.26.)  This is a
flawed analysis for multiple reasons.  First, the State neglects to mention that these were not the
only relevant facts the jury could consider.  For example, Mr. Austin had just finished an eight-
hour  shift  as  a  server  in  a  restaurant  and  explained  that  he  had  gout,  which  caused  him severe
foot and ankle pain throughout the sobriety tests.  (Tr. Vol.2, p.314, L.17 – p.315, L.10, p.180,
L.4 – p.181, L.11; State’s Exhibit 2 at 0:35 – 0:45, 3:00 – 3:30.)
Most importantly however, the State asks this Court to decide a jury question.  It was not
possible to tell whether the jury convicted Mr. Austin under the per se theory or the impairment
theory.  Because determining whether the impairment theory applied was a significant factual
question,  there  is  a  reasonable  possibility  that  the  error  affected  the  outcome  of  the  case.   As
such, the error was not harmless.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Austin respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction,
reverse the district court’s order granting the State’s motion in limine, and order that the district
court admit expert testimony regarding his alcohol concentration when he was driving at a new
trial.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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